What Stumbleupon Got Right
I've been fortunate to be close to the Stumbleupon team since the earliest days, first as an early user of Stumbleupon and then as the company's first investor and advisor who helped them get moved, incorporated and set up here in Silicon Valley. I have to say that I continue to be amazed at the number of things that the Stumbleupon team "got right" in its trajectory. Like all companies, it has its many warts and weaknesses, but it really nailed so many of the important things that are "must dos" for a startup. Here's my list of things that the SU team did exceptionally well that contributed directly to their successful 14 month-to-$75 million exit to eBay in 2007 (and will likely inform their continued success post-spinout from eBay):
1. GOOD INITIAL TIMING. Stumbleupon started quietly in a downturn when nobody was paying attention. Talk about anonymity: Imagine it is the tail end of the last recession and you are 3 guys freezing up in Calgary with no tech business experience and no real funds and you decide to build a button that delivers random webpages as a downloadable toolbar for Firefox only... Not a lot of attention coming your way. But, as many of us are finding in this most recent downturn, that is a massive blessing. Crazy ideas in recessions are a hallpass to create massive distance between you and any future competitor. You get more iterations and more failures under your belt without penalty. Best of all, you can execute in a space that doesn't even actually exist yet. When SU started, here is a shortlist of common things today that did not yet exist: Tag clouds, YouTube, bookmarking services like del.icio.us, Mechanical Turk, Digg, the concept of non-directed search ("discovery" today), plug-in or app stores and suffice to say, "web 2.0" was not yet a glimmer in Tim O'Reilly's eye (well, okay, maybe a glimmer. He's pretty smart.) Geoff, Garrett and Justin were riffing on all of these themes without identifying them. It was very fluid, very fast and a ton of fun. Everyone sensed something unique was happening, but did not have words for it yet.2. RABID FREAK ADDICTS. The early community in Stumbleupon was full of people who gave up their lives to the algorithm (you know who you are, since you're probably the first people reading this post...) Understand that these people aren't just "raving fans", they're "Rabid Freak Addicts" (RFA herein) These users, a tight subset of the first 100,000 or so users of SU, were very unique. They are largely still intact as a core today and are the silent backbone of the community. These are people who way back then already had 20,000 stumbles under their belt. RFA pretty much lived to Stumble. They cared about the community deeply. They policed it, managed content, innoculated SU against spam, corrected category errors, tested features and drove the founders crazy... But there was a clear understanding that this group of Stumblers was critical. Their recommendation feedback on pages was essential to the success of the community and it wouldn't have worked without them. Any startup needs its version of RFA. In an enterprise startup, the RFA might be less freaky, but you want folks who take you beyond hardcore. You need a small cadre of hyper-passionate customers to make your play get escape velocity.3. A BOOTSTRAPPING MENTALITY. The founders of SU did not have outside funds until they had already started generating revenues from their own proprietary advertising model, which is still its primary revenue source today. It was never an option to the founders to rely on some never-never future revenue stream by monetizing eyeballs and Adsense. They built their own way of making ad revenues with sponsored stumbles. It worked and its still a high leverage revenue stream that has never been successfully duplicated by a competitor. Most importantly, the founders had the mentality that they MUST have a revenue model. Was it perfect? Nope, but it was self-contained and basically true to the user experience and was therefore accepted by the community. This attitude then greatly informed how Justin, Garrett and Geoff looked at fund-raising when we got set up in San Francisco. They wanted just enough to hire folks and attract talent and not a penny more. One can argue the pros and cons of that attitude, but I would submit that its better to learn to get by on crumbs and then move to a small balanced meal rather than going hog wild at Old Country Buffet the moment that you can. There are exceptions to every rule, and I can argue either side of this depending on the company, but I think history bears out the value of "caloric restriction" on the early funding front for consumer web software plays.4. SIGNAL TO NOISE DETECTION. The entire team from development to marketing at SU was very good at separating transient trends from resonant ideas with long-term impact. By the time the guys were down in San Francisco, the web 2.0 frenzy was revved and running strong. Because the team was from elsewhere and socially removed from Silicon Valley culture, they were wallflowers in the larger community (Garrett has now single-handedly made up for lost time :-) This was useful for perspective-building, as there was a ton of pressure and uncertainty surrounding the team about what the "right" moves were. "Be more like Digg", "emphasize social networking more", "develop a non-toolbar version ASAP"... On the whole, I think the founders did a great job ignoring pretty much everything that was distracting to their core mission of making a better stumbling experience. "Stumble is not web 2.0" was often uttered within the company office. Being in that community but not of it was critical to the team's focus.5. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. The founders of SU had a very good sense of larger macro-trends happening around them. They did not need to sell the company to eBay or any other company and they easily could have "gone long" and raised an insane amount of money from the best names in venture capital. Many very smart people were encouraging them to do so. However, I recall several intense and candid conversations where they all looked at the market arc taking place around them and realized that it simply was not sustainable. The web 2.0 bubble had created a once-in-a-lifetime situation and the founders wanted to execute into that opportunity. They had seen the rising M&A valuations of other extremely young companies like theirs and they correctly ascertained that it would not continue to rise indefinitely. Discussions of the larger economic environment also informed their thinking: would there be a tech recession in 2008? (they suspected it was 50/50) When would the next exit ramp be if so? 2011? 2012? Given the very small amount of funding they had taken at that time (a little over $1 million) the decision to sell was still completely theirs to decide... in the future, with future funding, they knew that would not be the case. I think they made the right move. The real lesson for other entrepreneurs is that they had a keen situational awareness of their wider market realities and they were willing to act on their own best judgement.
Lots of great learning from a fascinating young company. I look forward to watching the guys do it again :-)
